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SERVITUDE AND CAPTIVITY IN THE COMMON LAW
OF MASTER-SERVANT: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S LABOR VISION
IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS ENACTMENT
Lea VanderVelde*
In the nineteenth century, the American common law of master and servant was
a system of subordination principles designed to command and capture the labor of
workers.1 Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England was the received
common law in the United States, from the early days of the Republic through the
settlement of new states in the American West.2 Blackstone’s Chapter Fourteen, en-
titled “Of Master and Servant,” organized the legal rules into a system of subordination
as formal inequality.3 Blackstone’s entire chapter used slavery as its foundation,4
rather than partnership or voluntary free labor. Even though the common law is cele-
brated for its flexibility and its potential to make iterative changes—“work itself pure,”
as some legal philosophers sometimes describe it5—Blackstone’s formal inequality
remained relatively unaffected during the early Republic.
Against this feudal common-law backdrop, Reconstruction egalitarianism in-
jected a breath of fresh air—an opportunity to redefine the relationship of working
people to their employers. An egalitarian, leveling ethos held sway as Reconstruc-
tion brought about a revolution in basic rights.6 This was an opportunity to revise
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1 KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 160–208 (1991); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR:
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350–1870, at
15–54 (1991); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 232–58 (1993).
2 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Univ. Chi.
Press 1979) (1765).
3 Id. at 410–20.
4 Id.
5 12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COMMON LAW 551 (1938). This
notion has had amazing staying power. See ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW OF THE
BODY (2018).
6 See infra Part II. Bruce Ackerman calls these “constitutional moments.” 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 160 (1998). During the congressional debates,
Congressman William H. Wadsworth of Kentucky remarked: “I did not mean it in any offensive
sense. But if this is not a revolution I do not know what is.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
340 (1864).
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the formal inequality of the common-law doctrine, as successive constitutional
amendments and national reconstruction reset the law in fundamental ways. Because
creating parity between working people and their employers was one of Reconstruc-
tion’s objectives, there were opportunities to revise master-servant legal doctrine in
a more balanced direction.7 With the Thirteenth Amendment’s enactment, all
workers were recognized as having a constitutional right to quit employment and
leave their employers.8 But more reforms—new work-related laws—were needed
as the freedmen transitioned to a free labor system in a climate in which the defeated
masters sought to maintain their positions of dominance over their former slaves. It
should be noted that the Thirteenth Amendment was targeted to eliminate two forms
of oppression: both racial domination and labor exploitation under slavery.9 The
Southern state legislatures moved quickly to enact statutes called “Black Codes” to
maintain their pre-war practices. Many of these were directed at race but others
framed labor practices.10
In a series of speeches over several months, members of Congress decried these
subordinating laws as Southern states revised their legislation. Often this new sub-
ordinating legislation was handily borrowed from similar aspects of common-law
doctrine.11 For example, one state legislated that hereafter African-American workers
would be referred to as “servants.”12 The abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude,
and the reconstruction of labor systems in the Southern states, should have been an
event of major reorganization in nineteenth-century master-servant law.
Yet, master-servant law survived Reconstruction,13 and American law continues
to bear its imprint to this day.14 So why did master-servant law survive? Or more partic-
ularly, why did the Reconstruction reforms fail to revise master-servant law? The an-
swer seems to be found in a combination of factors. The federal courts basically ignored
the Thirteenth Amendment, and they tightened the Fourteenth Amendment to a much
7 See infra Part II.
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; James Pope, What’s Different about the Thirteenth
Amendment, and Why Does It Matter?, 71 MD. L. REV. 189, 191 (2011); Lea VanderVelde, The
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 437, 438 (1989) [hereinafter
VanderVelde, Labor Vision].
9 Pope, supra note 8, at 192.
10 VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8, at 487–88.
11 Id. at 488–89.
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (remarks of Sen. Wilson citing new legislation in the
southern states, such as South Carolina and Georgia; followed by remarks of Sen. Sumner
describing objectionable new laws in Alabama and Mississippi).
13 Christopher Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47
INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 56, 70 (1995) (“Slavery’s abolition, for example, did not
bring about the obliteration of master and servant law. If anything, by liberating master/servant’s
application to hirelings from the inhibiting impediment of an obvious (and damaging) compari-
son it actually strengthened master and servant law.”).
14 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2 (AM. L. INST. 2015) [herein-
after RESTATEMENT] (containing many aspects of master-servant law).
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narrower field of application than the text actually provided.15 State courts, on the
other hand, have the major duty to revise the common law, but in order to do so, cases
must be brought to them. Procedurally, the common law specified the types of writs
available to plaintiffs, and while masters had several types of causes of action to bring
regarding their interests in their servants, servants did not. Blackstone’s chapter on mas-
ter and servant would be cited again and again, especially whenever there was no
clear basis on which to decide a case. And employee-plaintiffs had little recourse under
master-servant doctrine. Moreover, working people were not in a favored position to
bring their grievances to courts because they rarely had the legal resources to argue for
expansions of their labor rights. The sole right of action workers could use to defeat
their masters’ overreaching was the writ of habeas corpus, and habeas corpus could do
no more than see that the worker was released physically from his master’s captivity.
This Article first takes a closer look at Blackstone’s chapter on master and
servant.16 Second, it examines the anti-subordination agenda of the Reconstruction
Congress, which abolished involuntary servitude and engaged in structuring a free
labor system—a republican system of labor—to replace the slave labor system and
to bring the freedmen into parity with their former masters.17 Third, this Article
looks at how the courts interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment’s scope in the years
immediately after its enactment.18 This Part demonstrates that the federal courts
effectively closed off the path to develop the Thirteenth Amendment as an economic
right by limiting the universe of rights to consist of only those that were civil or
social rights. This Part also demonstrates how state courts viewed the Thirteenth
Amendment quite differently, and analogized more broadly or narrowly, depending
upon whether the court was in a Northern free state or a former slave state.19 North-
ern states were more willing to see the Thirteenth Amendment as a broad charter of
labor freedom, while former slave states read the Amendment so narrowly as to limit
its scope to merely abolishing the technical, legal status of chattel slavery.
I. AMERICA’S RECEIVED COMMON LAW: BLACKSTONE’S
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
Reconstruction’s effect upon work relations must be set within the larger his-
torical framework of the common law of master-servant law. This law dictated
subordinating relationships through all of the relationships of private life from a
master’s slaves, to his hired workers, and to his wife and children.20
One magisterial work, Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England pro-
vided the received common law in the United States. Chancellor Kent’s Commentaries
15 See infra Part III.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Section III.B.
20 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 410–20.
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were also influential,21 but the legal doctrines stated in Blackstone’s Commentaries
became synonymous with the common-law rules for most judges and attorneys. The
Commentaries were routinely consulted to determine what the common law was on the
antebellum frontier as the nation expanded. The Territorial Ordinances, like the
Northwest Ordinance, included provisions that the common law be the law in the
territories,22 and for most territorial courts that meant resorting to Blackstone’s work
when legal questions arose. Once territories became states, state constitutions also
routinely required that the law of the state be the common law.23
Blackstone’s Chapter Fourteen, entitled “Of Master and Servant” organized the
legal rules into a system of formal inequality that subordinated servant to master.24
This subordination was structured to authorize masters’ exclusive legally enforce-
able privileges to command the lives of their servants and also provided masters
with legal actions to constrain their servants—that is, command and captivity.25 In
turn, servants had almost no legally enforceable actions against their masters.26 One
example dramatizes the asymmetry. Blackstone stated that masters could lawfully
inflict corporal punishment on their servants, yet servants could never strike their
masters.27 This particularly graphic legal asymmetry authorized the dominant actor
to strike the subordinate and forbade the subordinate from fighting back.
Moreover, Blackstone constructed the servant’s legal status on the foundational
platform of slaves’ total domination by their masters, rather than on the foundation
of equal contracting parties.28 As slavery was the platform of Blackstone’s taxon-
omy, all other service relations were described as status modifications built upon
this base of absolute subjugation.29 Ironically, Blackstone chose slavery as his plat-
form despite acknowledging that slavery as such did not exist in England.30 The full,
21 CHANCELLOR JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826–1830) (1st ed.
1826).
22 Northwest Territorial Ordinance of 1787, § 4 (“There shall be . . . a court [which] shall
have a common law jurisdiction. . . .”).
23 See generally GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE:
TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (2004).
24 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 410–20.
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., id. at 416.
27 See Lea VanderVelde, The Last Legally Beaten Servant in America: From Compulsion
to Coercion in the American Workplace, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727 (2016) [hereinafter
VanderVelde, The Last Legally Beaten Servant].
28 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 418. Compelled labor had long been regarded as
permissible in England under The Statute of Laborers and Artifices. See generally MARC
LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE (1989).
29 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 413–15.
30 Id. at 411. Notably, Blackstone’s first edition contained a passage critical of slavery’s
legitimacy that is not present in later editions. Blackstone’s first edition states that when a slave
arrived in Britain, he became a free man, which was conditioned in later editions, as “pos-
sibly he became a free man.” Wilfrid Prest believes that Blackstone’s change may have been
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horrendous complexity of slave law came not from Blackstone, but from places in
the New World—like the American South.
Yet despite conceding that slavery was not legal in England, Blackstone was
comfortable stating that workers—referred to only by their first names in his text—
could be held to perpetual lifetime service:
[W]ith regard to any right which the master may have acquired,
by contract or the like, to the perpetual service of John or Thomas,
this will remain exactly . . . as before: for this is no more than the
same state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits
to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer term.31
One early American commentator, St. George Tucker, attempted to untangle the
anti-republican nature of Blackstone’s treatise. His attention, however, was focused
on matters of inheritance, such as primogenitor, and differences between a monarchy
and a federal system.32 He did not comment upon the hierarchies built into master-
servant law.33 Tucker, a resident of Virginia, where slavery was legal, did not discuss
the ways that slavery was inconsistent with republican forms of government. Such a
discussion would have undermined his own state’s law.34 To the contrary, Tucker
devoted an entire chapter of his book to explaining the laws of slavery in Virginia.35
Not only was Blackstone’s Commentaries the source of common-law doctrine
most often used in courts, it was also the training book for lawyers reading law. As
Timothy Walker wrote in 1837, “There is no work on American Law, at all suitable
for a first book; and we are compelled, for want of such a work, to commence with
Blackstone’s Commentaries on English law, to learn the rudiments of American law.”36
Moreover, Blackstone’s doctrine of master and servant became embedded in all later
treatises on the subject as well. Almost all early-nineteenth-century treatises struc-
tured their content around the chapter.37 Still, Blackstone’s chapter continued to
influenced by his conversations with abolitionist Granville Sharp, but the letters between the
men have vanished. See WILFRID PREST, LAWS AND LETTERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
250–52 (2008).
31 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 412–13.
32 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COM-
MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Phila., Birch & Small 1803) [hereinafter
TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE].
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 Id. at app. 79–139.
36 TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW: DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK
FOR STUDENTS 3 (1844).
37 For further explanation of this idea, see VanderVelde, The Last Legally Beaten Ser-
vant, supra note 27. Only James Schouler, influenced by Republicanism, deliberately chose
to organize his chapter differently, without slavery as its basis. See Lea VanderVelde, The
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have broader appeal than did specialized treatises. With its seemingly encyclopedic
breadth, Blackstone’s Commentaries provided an answer to almost everything.
By the time of Reconstruction, Blackstone’s template for master-servant rules
had been altered slightly. Specifically, a master’s right to chastise his servant physically
had become limited to situations where the master was a ship captain, or his servants
were slaves, and in some settings masters were permitted to chastise free, African
American workers who were not slaves.38 In addition, Blackstone’s legal rule for a
servant’s term of employment had altered. Blackstone maintained that general hirings
were to last for one year.39 This rule effectively protected workers in agricultural set-
tings from being let go without material support during seasons when there was little
work for them to do. But by Reconstruction, agriculture was no longer the primary
employment sector in the United States,40 so customary rules had evolved in differ-
ent work situations displacing Blackstone’s rule. Domestic servants, for example,
were hired by the month,41 and other employees’ expectations could be based on
their pay period, whether they were paid by the day, the week, or the month.42
The Reconstruction Congress was aware of Blackstone’s significant influence
on the American common law. To some, Blackstone was a mythical figure of au-
thoritative significance.43 To others, he was the butt of a joke told and repeated in
successive congresses. Congressman Lyman Trumbull of Illinois recounted:
I remember the Senator once told an anecdote in this body which
ran something like this: that on some occasion a justice of the
peace had made a very extraordinary decision, and the attorney
adversary to whom the decision had been made took up a volume
of Blackstone and read it to the justice of the peace, showing that
his decision was in direct conflict with the law as laid down in
Anti-Republican Origins of the At-Will Doctrine (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
[hereinafter VanderVelde, The Anti-Republican Origins].
38 VanderVelde, The Last Legally Beaten Servant, supra note 27, at 766–67, 777–80.
Black codes enacted in the Southern states during Reconstruction would seek to preserve this
practice by expressly legalizing the whipping of free blacks. Id. at 775–77.
39 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 415.
40 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877,
at 125 (1988) (discussing the decline of agriculture in the South during Reconstruction).
41 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING
HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER
AND SERVANT 607 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 2d ed. 1874) [hereinafter SCHOULER, DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS].
42 Id. See VanderVelde, The Anti-Republican Origins, supra note 37.
43 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 717 (1865) (statement of Sen. Grimes) (“Is there
a man here that ever read Blackstone, or that understands the rudiments of the English language,
or that knows anything about logic, that does not know . . . a negative pregnant”). Another
congressman stated, “It is not necessary to trouble the Senate by reading what Blackstone
says on the subject.” Id. at 720 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
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Blackstone’s Commentaries. The justice replied that that was no
authority for him. “No,” said the lawyer; “I did not read it with
the view of changing your opinion, but simply to show what a
fool old Blackstone was.”44
This joke was popular among congressmen; speakers riffed different variations of
the venerated English legal authority being called the “old fool.”45 But while Blackstone
could be joked about when courts chose not to follow him, as the joke also revealed,
attorneys trained in Blackstone could be expected to introduce the Commentaries
in litigation and would attempt to invoke its authority when the rules favored their
cause. Thus, Blackstone would be reintroduced to courts over and over again.
Blackstone laid out the four great relations of private life in Chapters Fourteen
through Seventeen: “Of Master and Servant,” “Of Husband and Wife,” “Of Parent
and Child,” and “Of Guardian and Ward.”46 Each of these relations had one domi-
nant and one subservient party. With the sequential and parallel ordering of these
chapters, the hierarchical structure of these various relations buttressed each other.
Discussions of corporal punishment, runaways, and damages accruing to the master
for another’s interference with his servant ran through the treatments of all four of
these “domestic relations” like common themes.47 In each of these relations, the
dominant party had disproportionate control over the subservient one.
These features of Blackstone’s ordering in Chapter Fourteen were explicitly
acknowledged by Senator Charles Sumner: “[T]he slave was always regarded,
legally and politically, as a part of the family of his master, according to the nomen-
clature of Blackstone’s Commentaries, which were much read at the time, where
master and servant were grouped with husband and wife, parent and child . . . .”48
As slavery and subordination were embedded in the structure of the common law
in this way, numerous congressmen sought to de-tangle the ban on slavery—the
foundational base of Blackstone’s structure—from the other controlling aspects of
44 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2056 (1866).
45 The next session of Congress, Congressman Dumont emphasized that the reason the
judge ruled Blackstone not to be precedent was because “it was a British book and not law in this
country. The attorney, however, insisted on reading it, not as the law, but that the court might see
what an old simpleton and block head Blackstone was.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. app.
164 (1867). The following Congress, Senator Morrill alluded to the common joke stating:
I am aware that the opinion of the Senate is adverse to that which I en-
tertain; and pretty much all I desire is to do what the lawyer said he
wanted to do after the court had decided against him—“I only want to
show what a fool Blackstone was.”
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1867).
46 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 410–34.
47 For example, Blackstone stated that husbands could exercise over their wives “do-
mestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or
children . . .” Id. at 444.
48 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 682 (1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
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the set of domestic relations.49 Once the base was abolished, how much did the
resulting structure change? What was the new foundational base? This sometimes
entailed distinguishing the duration of service—that is, perpetual lifetime bondage
of slaves to apprentices’ bound for a term of years. And this sometimes entailed
contrasting owning a man to owning a man’s services.50
When the Southern states began to adopt codes governing labor, Southern legis-
latures were particularly drawn to features of command and capture that had been
legitimated in Blackstone’s Commentaries. For example, when Southern states adopted
codes that followed a rule of forfeiture of pay if workers left before the end of a term,
codes that prohibited workers from moving, without permission, from one employer
to another, and codes that decreed that African American workers would thereafter
be called “servants”—they were borrowing from the blueprint of Blackstone’s version
of master-servant doctrine.51 The Reconstruction Congress took critical notice of
how oppressive these rules were in a series of speeches.52
II. HOW THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS’ ANTI-SUBORDINATION AGENDA
CHALLENGED THE MASTER-SERVANT HIERARCHY
The “Radical Republicans”53 sought not merely to release the slaves and destroy
the “peculiar institution” that existed in the South,54 but also to end all forms of
captive labor, bring workers into parity with their employers, and ensure they were
free from their influence.55 These things, they believed, were essential, not only for the
freedmen’s benefit but also for the nation, in order to issue into existence the kind of
republic that was the nation’s true promise.56 Simply abolishing slavery was insufficient
to that task, because the nation and its democratic institutions had been corrupted by
the oligarchical slave power since its founding.57 Radical change—to return to the
Republic’s roots—was necessary to reverse this corruption, to put the nation back on
the right track, and to move it forward to fulfill its promise. To that end, the Reconstruc-
tion Congress pursued a multifaceted program of initiatives—by enacting both fed-
eral statutes and constitutional amendment—on a broadly based anti-subordination
49 See VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8, at 451–85.
50 See infra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
51 See VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8.
52 See supra note 12; see also VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8 (examining
speeches made during the Reconstruction Congress condemning new statutes Southern states
were passing that attempted to maintain the captivity and subordination of freedmen).
53 The label “Radical Republicans” was self-given to demonstrate the level of change this
group sought to effect with respect to abolition and civil rights.
54 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1866) (statement of Sen. Willey).
55 See infra Section II.A.
56 See infra Part II.
57 3 HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA
443 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 7th ed. 1877).
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agenda.58 These measures sought to protect the freedmen, legislate nationally, and
engage in thorough-going revision of the laws of the District of Columbia.59
The Reconstruction Congress considered slavery inconsistent with republican
forms of government. As early as 1864, soon after the Emancipation Proclamation,
slavery was criticized as “an unrepublican system of labor.”60 In some ways, this en-
gagement with identifying the anti-republican rules in a system of labor can be seen
as taking St. George Tucker’s critique of the anti-republican features of Blackstone a
step further. Tucker only identified those anti-republican portions of Blackstone that
concerned government.61 The Reconstruction Congress went further to identify those
aspects of hierarchy in master-servant law that undermined a republican form of
government.
Slavery undermined the traditional republican ideals, because owning a slave
simultaneously amplified the master’s power in the Republic, creating a sort of aristoc-
racy, just as it oppressed the slave.62 Achieving a truly republican form of government
meant that these classes had to be leveled, and working people had to be autonomous
from their employers’ overreaching control. “Let the voting masses of any country
be composed of an independent yeomanry the majority of whom are freeholders of
moderate yet sufficient estate, let them be fairly schooled, intelligent, each one
bearing a fair share of the responsibilities of the Government . . . .”63 The Republi-
cans sought to make freedmen “masters of their time, their labor, and themselves.”64
Congress was unanimous in concluding that labor could no longer be compelled
in the United States because of the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.65 By
banning involuntary servitude, even labor under contract could not be compelled by
courts. Workers had a constitutional right to quit.66 Workers under signed contracts
could not be required to continue to work against their will.67 Workers could no
58 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment,
90 B.U. L. REV. 255, 277–94 (2010) [hereinafter Zietlow, Free at Last].
59 See infra Section II.B.
60 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 810 (1864) (statement of Rep. Scofield).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 32–35.
62 See Zietlow, Free at Last, supra note 58, at 274.
63 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) (statement of Rep. Shannon).
64 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 98 (1865) (statement of Rep. G. Clay Smith).
65 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859,
877 (2016) [hereinafter Zietlow, Positive Right].
66 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Pope, supra note 8; VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra
note 8, at 496 n.224.
67 Even Senator Cowan, who consistently advocated the most restrictive interpretations
of the Thirteenth Amendment, concurred in this interpretation. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 342 (1866). Cowan took as a basic assumption that employees could not be ordered
specifically to perform their labor contracts. He conceded:
Now, we are told the most impossible things in the world. . . . [W]e are
told gravely that the Legislature of Louisiana . . . have provided that . . .
the laborer is to be at the mercy of the hirer. How? Has the Legislature
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longer be held to labor. The fugitive-servant clause of the Old Constitution had been
overwritten.68 Workers could quit their jobs lawfully; they did not need to escape to
avoid oppression.
This left open the possibility, of course, that workers under contract could be sued
for damages if they did quit.69 Congress was a bit more ambivalent on that question.
Almost everyone realized that it was simply impractical to attempt to obtain dam-
ages from someone who labored for his existence if he exercised his constitutional
right to quit.70 But the key question in terms of a republican system of free labor was
whether these employees could be pursued at all. The more radical voices suggested
they could not.71
A. The Critique of Other “Unrepublican” Systems of Labor
Congress had a chance to address this issue subsequently in considering two
labor systems based upon debt that were also considered “unrepublican.” First,
Congress considered the system of peonage that had grown in the Territory of New
Mexico, and a system of obtaining laborers from Europe. Second, Congress consid-
ered labor immigration laws. Several large capital interests, including railroads, traf-
ficked in immigrants who were brought to the United States from Europe on paid
passage and then held to labor.
The discussion of peonage in New Mexico led to the passage of the Anti-Peonage
Act. In this discussion, the majority concluded that debt could not be leveraged to
compel labor.72 Under this system, white settlers held Native Americans to labor
through a practice of lending them money, goods, or credit and then holding them
to work off their debt.73 Most of these workers were held as domestic servants.74 As
Congress advanced the Anti-Peonage Act, reports in this system from New Mexico
claimed that the pre-arranged debt rendered the servitude voluntary—in fact, the
writer called it “voluntary, voluntary.”75 One senator, citing his own debts, felt that
of Louisiana declared that a contract for the performance of labor can
be specifically performed, and that you can compel specific performance
in her courts? If she has such a law (and that is the only way I know by
which the laborer can be put at the mercy of the hirer in a contract for
labor; it is the only possible and conceivable way apart from slavery)
such law is clearly void, and there is no possible difficulty in obtaining
a remedy for it anywhere and everywhere.
Id. (emphasis added).
68 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
69 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4043 (1866).
70 See Horace G. Wood’s complaint about this problem at HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT, ch. 4, § 135 (1st ed. 1877).
71 See infra notes 81–94 and accompanying text.
72 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571–72 (1867).
73 See id.
74 Id. (“[T]hey were generally remaining in the families of their masters . . . .”).
75 Id. (field report from New Mexico).
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this form of debt servitude was outside acceptable the scope of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s terms.76 Other senators were adamant, however, that this violated the Thirteenth
Amendment, and the measure passed. Senator Henry Wilson, for example, insisted
that even if occasionally the servitude was “voluntary,” it was “forcible” nonetheless
and therefore invidious.77
The issue of debt servitude surfaced again later when Congress considered a
statute on immigration regulating the obligation of redemptioners to repay monies
advanced to them.78 The statute in question had been on the books before the Thir-
teenth Amendment was enacted. It attempted to secure enforcement of labor con-
tracts made abroad with foreign workers who sought to come to America.79 Railroads
were in the practice of sending agents to Europe in search of workers, signing them
into labor contracts, bringing them to American shores, and then transporting them
west where they would work for the railroad.80 Fearing that these workers would
abandon their labor contracts after arriving in the United States, these employers
sought additional legal measures to ensure that they could pursue the working men
wherever they went.81 In some ways, this immigration statute encompassed both the
historic practice of redemptioner immigration82 and the fugitive-servant clause that
the Thirteenth Amendment had overwritten.83
The Senate debate over this statute was contentious. Senator Wilson quickly
analogized the measure to slavery calling it “a kind of slave trade.”84 Several other
senators also condemned the measure,85 stating that it “smack[ed] so nearly of that
trade which was African, and was forbidden in the Constitution of the United States.”86
One senator called it:
more monstrous . . . in character than the negro slavery that we
have abolished. . . . [T]hese plans, cunningly devised, by which
capital is to seize labor, by which labor is to be turned up in its
vise and held as if poverty were a crime, I am utterly opposed to,
for they are repugnant to my sense, and all the conceptions I
have of what is right among men.87
76 Id. (statement of Sen. Davis).
77 See id. (statement of Sen. Wilson).
78 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 4040–44 (1866).
79 Id.
80 See id. at 4040–41.
81 See id.
82 See KARL FREDERICK GEISER, REDEMPTIONERS AND SERVANTS IN THE COLONY AND
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (2010).
83 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIII.
84 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4041 (1866).
85 Id. at 4040–43 (statements of Senators Howe, Morrill, Conness, and Cowan).
86 Id. at 4040 (statement of Sen. Morrill).
87 Id. at 4043 (statement of Sen. Conness).
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Another senator stated that it was “so closely allied to the Coolie business that the
committee was astonished that the Senate ever gave it a moment’s consideration.”88
Yet, one senator claimed that it was for the benefit of the immigrants,89 to which
another quickly replied that the same had been said about slavery.90 The senators
debated whether this constituted a lien on the man’s services or a “mortgage on the
man himself.”91 One defender of the provision stated that “there is no slavery about
it except the slavery that exists in the case of any man who gets in debt for any sum,
and whose debts by the law of the place where he may be are made an encumbrance
upon any real estate that he may have.”92 But, of course, these immigrants had no
real estate, only their prospects to perform labor.
In the end, the statute failed.93 The overall sentiment of Congress weighed against
the notion of holding a huge debt over an impoverished man in such a way as to ob-
ligate him to continue to work when that work was involuntarily done.94 This was
a direct repudiation of employers attempts to recapture their workers. 
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to quit. Free men should
be able to quit work for any reason that they found oppressive or objectionable.95
B. The Reconstruction Congress’s Efforts to Bring Freedmen and Other Working
People to Parity with Their Employers
The same leveling anti-subordination spirit animated Congress’s many progres-
sive reforms.96 Since Congress exercised plenary authority over the common law in
88 Id. at 4040 (statement of Sen. Morrill); id. at 4041 (“Another objection, it is said, is—‘that
the workman may be harshly treated, and so justified in running away.’ Somebody, he imagines,
will raise that objection. He answers that—‘The workman has some security in the fact that it is
for the interest of every employer to treat him well, that he may not run away.’ I supposed
we had got through with that kind of argument long ago, especially when we emancipated
the slaves.”).
89 Id. at 4042–43 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
90 Id. at 4043.
91 Id. at 4042 (statement of Sen. Howe).
92 Id. (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
93 See id. at 4044.
94 See id. at 4042–43 (“Mr. Howe: There is only one way of enforcing it, and that is spe-
cifically against the man. Mr. Johnson: To make him labor? Mr. Howe: Yes; make him labor.
It means that or it means nothing. . . . I think that this law has stood on the statute-book too
long. I therefore favor . . . repeal[ing] this act instead of enlarging it.”).
95 SCHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, supra note 41, at 754–55. See also infra Section
III.B.1 (explaining Ford v. Jerman, in which a departing working woman was not expected
to explain the reasons why she quit).
96 Many of these reforms paved the way for the abolition of slavery. For discussion on
the reforms implemented in the District of Columbia, see KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR
ALL THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
(2010); and Lea VanderVelde, Henry Wilson: Cobbler of the Frayed Constitution, Strategist
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the District of Columbia, it could unquestionably reform any subordinating aspects
of the common law in that jurisdiction.97 In this expansive set of enactments one can
get a sense of the Radicals’ thinking about how the received common law should be
reformed. Congressmen regularly saw themselves as moving beyond the status quo
in reforms. They saw themselves as taking the lead which states could then follow.98
Sometimes, they were conscious that they were as engaging in experiments that
might or might not be successful.99 
This reform agenda was very broad, but it was almost always leveling. For ex-
ample, in discussing the pay structure for federal employees, one congressmen
stated, “I want either that the wages of labor shall be leveled up or that the pay of
public officers shall be leveled down.”100 More often than not, Congress introduced
laws that raised the stature of lesser individuals. Specifically, Congress passed legisla-
tion that brought greater parity to married women, tenants, debtors, and, finally, their
own federal employees and contractors.101 As common-law hierarchy had subordi-
nated married women to their husbands under the doctrine of coverture, Congress
enacted the Married Women’s Property Reform in the District of Columbia to rectify
this.102 Congress also reformed the District’s landlord-tenant law to provide tenants
with some notice to quit before eviction and to eliminate the status of tenancy at will.103
Congress reformed Bankruptcy law to give more protection to debtors.104 As a major
war-time employer, Congress enacted substantial pay raises for federal employees,105
and, finally, applying its authority to regulate the employment relationship directly,
Congress enacted an Eight-hour day law for all federal workers.106
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 173, 203–08 (2017) [hereinafter
VanderVelde, Henry Wilson].
97 VanderVelde, Henry Wilson, supra note 96, at 205.
98 Id. at 206.
99 See id.
100 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2890 (1868) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (“The
mechanics and laborers of the United States do not receive a compensation at all propor-
tionate to that which is paid for official services.”).
101 See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
102 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2162 (1868) (Married Women’s Property Reform
introduced); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1709 (1869) (reform passed).
103 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1772 (1866). Bill (S. No. 138) regulated proceedings
in cases between landlord and tenants in the District of Columbia:
That a tenancy at will shall not arise or be created without an express con-
tract or letting to that effect; and all estates at will may be determined by
a notice, in writing, to quit of thirty days, delivered to the tenant in hand
or to some person of proper age upon the premises, or in the absence of
such tenant or person then such notice may be served by affixing the same
to a conspicuous part of the premises, where it may be conveniently read.
Id.
104 CONG GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess.
105 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess.
106 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1969 (1866).
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The Eight-hour day law was a measure that stipulated that eight hours was to be
the legal work day in all federal workshops.107 Though the law deemed that employ-
ees could not be required to work longer than eight hours, no one seemed to be clear
about how this durational limit would affect wages.108 Would employees be paid the
same as they had before when working longer days?109 Some congressmen thought
that healthy, well-rested workers could accomplish the same amount of work in
eight hours as tired workers could do in ten.110
This was conceived as an experiment that the federal government could afford to
undertake.111 Like other reform measures, Congress’s justification for an eight-hour
day was tied to creating a healthy republic.112 To free workers from their employers’
demands would allow them to develop themselves as independent citizens.113 Working
persons needed adequate time away from the workshop to develop the autonomy
and skills necessary to participate in republican governance.114 Representative Cole
stated, “the residue of the time . . . would well be devoted to the improvement of the
mind and social faculties; and all American citizens should be enabled to devote
107 For excellent accounts of how the management of time was a concern of labor move-
ments, see ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH:
LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2015); BENJAMIN KLINE
HUNNICUTT, WORK WITHOUT END: ABANDONING SHORT HOURS FOR THE RIGHT TO WORK
(1988); and DAVID R. ROEDIGER & PHILLIP S. FONER, OUR OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERI-
CAN LABOR AND THE DAY (1989). The Eight-hour day was advanced by political arguments of
workingmens’ organizations, many of whom sent supporting petitions to Congress. See Zietlow,
Positive Right, supra note 65, at 872–73.
108 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3425 (1868).
109 Id. at 3424–29.
110 Id. at 3424 (statement of Sen. Conness).
111 Id. at 3425 (statement of Sen. Morton).
112 Id. at 3426 (statement of Sen. Wilson).
113 Id. at 3425 (statement of Sen. Stewart):
There might be greater comfort given to the workingman; there might be
an improvement in the condition of society; and if there should be an ap-
proximate amount of labor, something near the same amount as now, the
other good results might be sufficient to justify the adoption of the reform.
I have no idea but that taking the term of years through which men labor,
an individual will, in the course of his life, accomplish more with eight
hours a day than he will with ten hours a day labor. I think he will live
longer, so that in the course of his natural life he will do more work if he
works eight hours a day regularly than he will if he works ten hours. If
you put the value of men on the amount of labor they can do in the course
of their natural lives I think men will be more valuable who work eight
hours a day than if they work ten hours a day. I think they will accomplish
more in the course of their natural lives; they will not wear out so soon,
and if there is any object in prolonging human life and increasing the ag-
gregate of human happiness the argument would be in favor of this bill.
Id.
114 See id.
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some portion of their time to the cultivation of the intellect.”115 Cole then moved
from worker welfare to national welfare:
Our Republic stands upon the intelligence of the people; it has no
other foundation; and unless the people are provided by law with
some protection against the requirement which is now put upon
them by the exorbitant demands of capitalists, they will not be so
well prepared to perform the duties of American citizenship.116
Although Senator Henry Wilson, a leader of the Radical Republicans,117 supported
the Eight-hour day law, he believed that other matters were more pressing for
laboring men.118 Wilson said, “Whatever tends to dignify manual labor or to lighten
its burdens, to increase its rewards or enlarge its knowledge, should receive our
sympathies and command our support.”119 However, the eight-hour day measure
would only effect several hundred federal workers, while of greater concern were
the laboring men in the “tens of thousands . . . who [had] been dismissed from em-
ployment for voting according to their convictions.”120
Congress had no direct authority to revise state law. That had been a major objec-
tion to passing the Thirteenth Amendment in the first place because slavery was
governed by state law. Yet, in abolishing slavery, the federal government had done ex-
actly that: it had cut deeply and directly into states’ authority to design their own
common law, both in regard to property and master-servant relationships. Congress had
abolished the slave states’ basis of legalized slavery and all that related to that base.121
Could Congress have regulated unfair treatment of employees? That would depend
upon how carefully the statute was drafted. Congress had authority under Section Two
of the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate any employment practice that threatened to
reduce individuals to slavery or involuntary servitude.122 Presumably then, Congress
had authority to set minimally acceptable working terms and conditions. There was
some discussion about how far congressional authority extended to regulate private
employers throughout the nation.123 But, in any case, Congress did not do so.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 For a discussion of the influential role Senator Wilson had during his time in Congress,
see VanderVelde, Henry Wilson, supra note 96.
118 See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3425–26 (1868).
119 Id. at 3426.
120 Id. at 2804 (“There are committees here from several States begging money; and I am
writing to my friends to contribute money to keep men from starvation. Humanity and every-
thing that can appeal to the human heart, and the feelings of every man who respects the
laboring men of the country, should impel us to pass these reconstruction measures, and let
those people have governments that will protect them at the earliest moment.”).
121 Pope, supra note 8, at 190–97.
122 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
123 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (1866) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (“What
earthly power, I would ask the Senator from Massachusetts, has the Congress of the United
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When congressmen like Senator Henry Wilson expressed deep concern about
freedmen being dismissed from their jobs for exercising their right to vote,124 Repub-
licans moved to address the problem by the less controversial avenues through which
Congress could exert its authority: enacting an additional constitutional amendment
specifically to enlarge suffrage, reforming election practices,125 and authorizing the
Freedmen’s Bureau to ensure employment practices were just and fair.126
C. Reconciling Free Labor with Master-Servant Doctrine
Free labor, as the antithesis of involuntary servitude and slavery, is a concept of
considerable ambiguity.127 Within its range of meanings, the concept served the in-
terests of both workers and some entrepreneurs.128 Freedom, of course, can mean both
“free from” and “free to.”129 At its most limited interpretation, free labor meant simply
to be “free from” working under some form of compulsion.130 A broader notion guaran-
teed that working people could enjoy a certain sphere of independence to be “free
to” pursue their lives and livelihoods without obstacles of caste, class, or oligarchy
in their way.131 This broader notion of a nation comprised of independent working
people distinguished the Radical Republicans and labor republicanism from others
favoring abolition.132
States to regulate the compensation which a private citizen of the United States, in any of the
States or Territories of the Union, may choose to make to any other private citizen for services
rendered? . . . Has it come to this, that the powers of this Government have become so
enlarged that it can enter into all the private transactions of life . . . regulate the prices of
wages throughout the United States?”).
124 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2804 (1868).
125 See VanderVelde, Henry Wilson, supra note 96, at 176–78.
126 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 415 (1866).
127 See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded
Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 768; see also VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER:
THE ORIGINS OF BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); MARK A. LAUSE, FREE
LABOR: THE CIVIL WAR AND THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (2015).
128 Forbath, supra note 127, at 776.
129 See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
130 Pope, supra note 8, at 192 (“Today, Thirteenth Amendment rights claims generally fall
into one of two categories: rights to be free from certain forms of race discrimination, con-
ceptualized as ‘badges and incidents of slavery,’ and rights of labor freedom, analyzed under
the involuntary servitude clause.”).
131 William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20, 61
(1999) (discussing the right one has to sell their labor).
132 W.E.B. Dubois recognized this distinction:
[T]wo movements—Labor-Free Soil, and Abolition, exhibited funda-
mental divergence instead of becoming one great party of free labor and
free land. The Free Soilers stressed the difficulties of even the free
laborer getting hold of the land and getting work in the great congestion
which immigration had brought; and the abolitionists stressed the moral
wrong of slavery.
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Two factors help delineate the tension between the labor vision and master-servant
law. The first—the historical factor—concerned that period of time when congress-
men turned their attention to the ways that labor systems built on master-servant law
impeded the nation from becoming a Republic of free and equal working men.133
During this discussion, the labor vision was also advanced by political arguments
of working men’s organizations in the Eight-hour day movement,134 as well as in the
letters of Union soldiers engaged in fighting the war.135 The Radicals’ vision was not
universally shared, of course, but as a group the Radicals led the reforms. They were
the relevant lawmaking congressional leaders of the efforts to reform the Constitu-
tion.136 Their vision encompassed some of the loftiest aims for the nation. Thus,
theirs is the unfinished agenda of Reconstruction. Considering the various voices in
Congress at that crucial time, it seems that more attention was paid to the most progres-
sive among them than to the more reluctant, recalcitrant voices. They led the efforts
to overturn President Johnson’s vetoes and garnered the majority of votes.
The second factor—the analytical—addresses the juridical common-law struc-
ture of master and servant and its construction upon the basis of slavery in a hierar-
chical frame which accorded rights and privileges asymmetrically in favor of masters.137
The structure of master-servant law was premised upon a framework of inherently
property-like rights that masters held in the services of their employees.138 This structure
ran across the Commentaries. Husbands similarly held property-like rights in their
wives, and fathers had property-like rights in their daughters’ and sons’ services. As
abolition vanquished property interests in human beings, did it also vanquish property
interests in a man’s services? There were several property-like privileges encased
in master-servant concepts. These included writs of enticement139 and seduction,140
the unreciprocated duty of loyalty, and the doctrine of contract of the entirety141—all
W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF
THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA, 1860–1880, at 18 (1935).
133 See supra Part II.
134 GOUREVITCH, supra note 107, at 98–100.
135 See LAUSE, supra note 127.
136 DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICAN
1862–1872, at 72 (noting that the Radicals had provided the leaders and congressional floor
leaders for the four decisive war measures).
137 See supra Part I.
138 See supra Part I.
139 See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: Binding Men’s
Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L.J. 775 (1992) [hereinafter VanderVelde, Gen-
dered Origins]; Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees,
46 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1993).
140 See Lea VanderVelde, The Legal Ways of Seduction, 48 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1996)
[hereinafter VanderVelde, Legal Ways].
141 Robert W. Gordon, Britton v. Turner: A Signpost on the Crooked Road to “Freedom”
in the Employment Contract, in CONTRACT STORIES 23 (Douglas Baird ed., 2007).
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of which allowed employers to keep their employees captive by curtailing the latter’s
mobility to move on, after employers could no longer compel them to work.
These privileges were not only property-like; in fact, Blackstone referred to
services as property.142 He premised the master’s enticement action upon the fact
that the master “owned” his servant’s services: “The reason and foundation upon
which all this doctrine is built, seem to be the property that every man has in the
service of his domestics; acquired by the contract of hiring, and purchased by giving
them wages.”143 These privileges were asymmetrical in that there was no corre-
sponding counterpart accorded to employees. Employees did not acquire property
in their jobs. Nor could employees sue employers for hiring employees who might
take their jobs.144 Despite vaulted pronouncements of freedom in the concept of
“liberty of contract,” and the oft-cited need for mutuality in contractual relations,
these legal rules—rules that permitted employers to constrain their employees’ actions
through contractual capture of their services—imposed no reciprocal set of obliga-
tions to which employees could hold their employers.145
What is the difference between owning a man and owning his services if his
services occupy a considerable extent of his life? Is a person actually a free laborer,
free from his employer, if his services are owned? These asymmetrical common-law
actions survived Reconstruction,146 and to the extent that they did, master-servant
law was never fully “de-chattelized.”
III. HOW THE LABOR VISION LOST GROUND IN THE COURTS
In the late 1870s, as the engine of Reconstruction was slowing, there were several
legal developments that would impede, if not destroy, further development of the
jurisprudence of the Thirteenth Amendment. First was the anti-republican labor de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court;147 second, the exultation of a formalistic
contract theory in legal jurisprudence;148 and third, the racist, regressive legal develop-
ments, such as Jim Crow laws, and other racially illiberal Court opinions that set
back economic and social opportunities and reforms for African Americans in con-
travention of the Reconstruction’s promises.149
142 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 417.
143 Id. (emphasis added).
144 See VanderVelde, Gendered Origins, supra note 139.
145 See supra Part I.
146 See, for example, duty of loyalty in the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 14. On the writ of seduction, see VanderVelde, Legal Ways, supra note 140. On nega-
tive specific performance, see VanderVelde, Gendered Origins, supra note 139, at 775.
147 See infra Section III.A.
148 See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. The employment at will doctrine
emerged at this time. For its history, see VanderVelde, The Anti-Republican Origins, supra
note 37.
149 See infra Section III.B.
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A. Cramped and Limiting Rulings in the United States Supreme Court
The narrative of how the Supreme Court shut down the promise of Reconstruc-
tion by miserly interpretations in a series of cases—The Slaughter-House Cases,150
Bradwell,151 Cruikshank,152 Robertson,153 and Plessy154—is well known.155 Concomi-
tantly, the Court effectively destroyed the prospect of recognizing a positive right to
free labor in its jurisprudence.156 The majority’s interpretations were clearly antithetical
to the Radicals’ view of Reconstruction. From the perspective of the Radical Republi-
cans, the Court got it wrong.157
Justice Bradley took the lead in creating a jurisprudence in authoring The Civil
Rights Cases.158 In striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a law that would have
permitted African Americans the social rights of access to places of public accom-
modation, Justice Bradley neatly divided all legal rights into two categories: civil
150 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
151 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
152 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). For discussion of Cruikshank, see
James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at
the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (2014).
153 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
154 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
155 Professor Justin Collings provides the following account:
The process began with the Slaughter-House Cases, in which a five-Jus-
tice majority held that the Thirteenth Amendment banned only slavery
itself and close analogues; that the Equal Protection clause forbade de jure
discrimination against blacks, but not much else; and that the Privileges
or Immunities Clause guaranteed only the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship, which on the Court’s telling, were few and flimsy.
Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and the Memory of Evil, 71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 271 (2019).
For discussion of Plessy v. Ferguson, see James W. Fox Jr., Doctrinal Myths and the Manage-
ment of Cognitive Dissonance: Race, Law, and the Supreme Court’s Doctrinal Support of
Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293 (2005). See also Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat.
335; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
156 Forbath, supra note 127, at 773. In the Slaughter-House Cases, the majority opinion
indicated that there was some breadth for interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, but never
charted a course for doing so. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 54 (1873). The decision effectively shut off
workingmen’s rights from even the application of a balancing test when they challenged legis-
lation denying them the right to continue to ply their trade.
157 See FONER, supra note 40, at 530. Yet, even in these reform-ending Court decisions, there
were dissents that sounded the familiar notes of the Republicans’ labor vision. See, e.g., The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 83–111 (Field, J., dissenting); Joseph Fishkin & William E.
Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 669, 678 (2014). William Forbath
has analyzed how Justice Stephen Field’s dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases resounded the
vision of free labor. Forbath, supra note 127, at 772–800.
158 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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and social.159 Those legal rights that were civil rights were subject to congressional
authority while those that were social were not.
There was no place in this division for the recognition of socio-economic rights.
Where would a positive right to free labor fit? Where would the right to be free from
labor exploitation fit?
Justice Bradley could not find the Civil Rights Act grounded in the Thirteenth
Amendment. And he described the Amendment so narrowly as to only apply to
citizenship rather than to private actions. He wrote:
[In 1866,] Congress did not assume, under the authority given by
the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social
rights of men and races in the community; but only to declare and
vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence
of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which consti-
tutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery.160
In Bradley’s categorical dichotomy, a right would be a civil right only to the
extent that it pertained to citizenship and consequently entailed state action.161 This
ignored the significance of the Thirteenth Amendment in revising labor systems com-
pletely and hence limited Bradley’s focus to the Fourteenth Amendment. Adjusting
the relative rights of masters and servants would not be recognized as within the
Reconstruction Congress’s authority at all.162 By this means, the Court declared the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional because it regulated a social right—a kind of
right which in Justice Bradley’s characterization Congress could not legally regulate.163
The right to engage in free labor, however, was an economic right.164 The Re-
construction Congress considered it foundational to the nation becoming a republic
of laborers. But it did not fit in Bradley’s civil/social dichotomy. By dividing the
universe of rights into this dichotomy, it sucked all the air out of the notion that
there might be yet another kind of right, an economic right legitimate for Congress’s
exercise of authority under the Thirteenth Amendment. The only economic rights
159 Id.
160 Id. at 22 (italics added). In this formulation, Bradley implied that the distinction between
freedom and slavery was a simple matter to decide. See id.
161 See id. at 11.
162 An enactment would represent a social right, in Bradley’s view, if it mandated some kind
of social interchange that one of the parties preferred not to engage in. Social rights then, seem-
ingly, were rights to disassociate from others, rather than rights to associate with others—for
example, to form a union.
163 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3 (ruling the Civil Rights Act of 1875 uncon-
stitutional).
164 For the right to engage in free labor as a positive and economic right, see supra note
148 (discussing the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases); see also Zietlow, Positive Right,
supra note 65, at 879.
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suitable for recognition then seemed to be limited to the right to hold property and
to make contracts—those guaranteed by Congress in the Civil Rights Statute of 1866.165
Thus, the Supreme Court took the direction of closing down Reconstruction rather
than continuing or extending it.
What the nineteenth-century contract terminology failed to acknowledge was
that contracts made between people generally tend to replicate their power positions.
Persons without decent options agree to contracts that cede more of the benefits—and
perhaps many more of their rights—than they would ever willingly relinquish if they
had more options or leverage in the negotiation. To the extent that the Reconstruction
Congress’s objective was to create a republican society of equals to replace the oligar-
chical, autocratic society of slavemasters, contracts are hardly the right instrument
to achieve this goal. Contracts—that is, contract doctrine and terminology—cannot
move society to the republican ideal. The contractarian ideal, popular as it may have
seemed, was in tension with the pathway to a republic of true equals.166 If the starting
point is inequality, liberty of contract cannot be the corrective. Moreover, some con-
tracts are so oppressive that they cannot be insulated from intervention by the prin-
ciple of contractual liberty.167
B. State Courts Provide Some Contradictory Interpretations
Since master-servant doctrine is a part of a state’s common law, state legislatures
and state courts are the most appropriate entity to revise it. State legislatures did take
165 See Zietlow, Positive Right, supra note 65, at 879.
166 Id. For discussion on the role of contract language as a beacon of hope, see AMY DRU
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN
THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998).
167 To make the connection more clearly: If one has true liberty of contract, is a person free
to contract himself into involuntary servitude, or even slavery for a time? The Thirteenth Amend-
ment’s strict prohibition on involuntary servitude dictates that those circumstances shall not
exist so such an arrangement cannot be created by contract. At least one American court actually
heard such a case and deemed this impermissible. Nelson v. Smithpeter, 42 Tenn. 13 (1865),
considered the interesting question. Enslaved women Susan and Lucinda were given the
following Hobson’s choice in their master’s will: they could be freed and removed to another
country, presumably under the Colonization Society’s auspices, or they could remain in the
state if they agreed to remain enslaved. Id. at 13–14. Many states required manumitted slaves
to leave the state, leaving voluntary re-enslavement as the only means to remain near one’s an-
cestral home and other family members. See JUDITH KELLER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE,
REMAINING FREE: MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS, 1846–1862 (2003).
So remaining enslaved may have been the only way they could live near their family members.
Lucinda died leaving a son and Susan to choose to remain, becoming a slave of the state, such
that the sheriff hired Susan and Lucinda’s son out for work and confiscated their wages. Nelson,
42 Tenn. at 14. After the Thirteenth Amendment, their status was less clear, and heirs sought to
revoke parts of the will suggesting that technically their status was one of “voluntary servitude.”
Id. Since the ban on involuntary servitude and slavery is absolute in the Amendment, the Court
declared them not only free, but entitled to the wages they had earned while being hired out.
Id. at 14–15.
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up the work of enacting labor laws in the late nineteenth century, though courts were
striking them down as not within the states’ police powers.168
Although state courts are charged with revising the common law of master and
servant, they cannot take the initiative to revise the common law on their own. It can
only be revised on a case-by-case basis if there is a case brought before the court of
record. Few employees have the means to access the courts if it requires hiring a
lawyer. In the nineteenth century, cases brought by employees against their employ-
ers were extremely rare. Even when workers’ interests were at stake, for example,
in the development of the at-will rule, the cases tended to be contests between
employers and third parties; workers were not even represented.169
Much of this inertia can be attributed to workers’ inability to access the courts
(and lawyers). But Blackstone’s asymmetrical Chapter Fourteen tilted the scales
structurally. It accorded several causes of actions to employers to go to court to re-
tain control and capture of their employees, but it did not accord employees recipro-
cal causes of action to bring against their employers for their grievances, such as
employer abuse or attempts at overreaching the bounds of legitimate workplace
control. So among the universe of the nineteenth century cases in state courts utilizing
master-servant doctrine, only a tiny fraction are lawsuits brought by employees.
Nonetheless, in the years immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment was en-
acted, state courts rendered inconsistent decisions concerning the Amendment’s
effect on state common law.
Given its simplicity, breadth, and phrasing as an absolute, the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was invoked in a diverse variety of cases involving the interests of freedmen,
free blacks, and free men and women of all races in their working, social, and
political lives.170 Some cases attempted to push out the envelope of liberties afforded
to people of color and women to the full extent of the liberties enjoyed by white
men.171 Some cases attempted to settle the score in pre-abolition financial situations
168 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
169 See, e.g., Payne v. W. & Atl. Ry. Co., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884); VanderVelde, The Anti-
Republican Origins, supra note 37.
170 See, e.g., Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43 (1872) (pressing for the ability of white
women to vote in California); Handy v. Clark, 9 Del. (4 Houst.) 16 (1869) (pressing for the
competency of African Americans to testify in court proceedings involving whites); Cory v.
Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874) (pressing for the ability of African American children to be ad-
mitted to all-white public schools); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866) (discussing the effect
of the Amendment on the ability of an African American, who had previously been free, to sue
in court); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867) (analyzing the effect of the
Thirteenth Amendment upon a bequest directed at abolishing slavery); Williams v. Johnson,
30 Md. 500 (1869) (evaluating abolition’s effect on a trover lawsuit regarding the value of
a Black man); Brittle v. People, 2 Neb. 198 (1873) (pressing for the ability of an African Amer-
ican man to serve on jury panel).
171 See supra note 170.
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in which a slave had been collateral for a debt, and that person was now free.172 A
few dealt directly with circumstances of labor capture.173
The interpretive inconsistency of different state courts is particularly glaring in
the short duration between the time—when Congress finally passed the Thirteenth
Amendment—and the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.174 With two major congressional enactments occurring so quickly after its
passage, the Thirteenth Amendment seemed to be left in the background of doctrinal
development as the later congressional enactments took center stage.175
While the Fourteenth Amendment was detailed and applied to state action, the
Thirteenth Amendment was blunt, broad, and crossed the public-private divide.176
It applied to private actors as well as to state action.177 Arguments in civil-, social-,
and economic-rights cases consequently gravitated to the more detailed Fourteenth
Amendment.178 The Thirteenth Amendment was often treated as simply a make-
weight argument and examined only superficially.179
Yet, the Fourteenth Amendment did not overwrite the Thirteenth, as for example,
the Thirteenth overwrote Article Four’s fugitive-servant clause.180 It amplified it with
regard to the dimensions of specific kinds of state action. The Fourteenth Amendment
could not overwrite the Thirteenth because the Thirteenth had a much broader scope of
application. The Thirteenth did not depend upon the existence of an offensive, unconsti-
tutional state statute or executive order. It declared that the state of slavery and involun-
tary servitude “shall not exist.”181 As James Pope writes, this should have placed an
affirmative duty on federal and state governments to root out these systems.182
172 See, e.g., Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625 (1869); Coward v. Thompson, 44 Tenn. 442
(1867).
173 Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503 (1865); Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865); Nelson
v. Smithpeter, 42 Tenn. 13 (1865).
174 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed April 9, 1866, after both houses of Congress
overrode President Johnson’s veto just fourteen months after the Thirteenth Amendment cleared
the House on the second attempt. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress on
June 13, 1866, and ratified on July 28, 1868.
175 For a discussion of the unique nature of the Thirteenth Amendment, see Pope, supra
note 8.
176 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make . . . nor shall any State de-
prive . . . .”), with id. amend. XIII, § 1 (“[S]lavery . . . shall [not] exist within the United
States . . . .”).
177 See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
178 See Zietlow, Positive Right, supra note 65, at 895 (discussing how Congress invoked
its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Thirteenth Amendment,
during the debates prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
179 See id. at 887 (discussing how the Thirteenth Amendment was not invoked per se but
rather comparisons to slavery were used to argue for better working conditions).
180 U.S. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
181 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
182 Pope, supra note 8.
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Among the state cases invoking the Thirteenth Amendment.183 The political dy-
namics usually presented a litigant using the Amendment as a defense against some
penalty, whether it be an injunction, a criminal penalty, a forfeiture, or an unwanted
obligation, like rent service.184 This meant that from the very beginning, the Thirteenth
Amendment was used to play defense rather than offense. As such, its effect in reform-
ing state common law would need to await the occasion of an employer engaging
in overreaching, in order for the subordination principles of the received common law
to be challenged in court and removed. Otherwise inertia favored the maintenance
of the received common law. So, for the most part, the state courts failed to develop
an affirmative right to engage in free labor. State courts seemed reluctant to recon-
sider master-servant rules under the lights that had been shown upon the hierarchical
system by the Reconstruction Congress. State courts were rarely presented with
circumstances where the employer’s disproportionate control over their employees
could be perceived as affecting the nation as a fully functioning republic.185
So how far was the Thirteenth Amendment expected to extend? One scholar
argues that Congress intended it to raise the working conditions in the South only
as high as the standard of master-servant law existing in the North at the time.186 But
that does not seem true to the Reconstruction debates. Congress saw itself and the
country as continually moving forward.187
An example of one of the more creative arguments was raised in an 1864 New
York case involving rent service.188 The litigant sought to get out of an obligation to
perform a day’s service, and deliver an annual tribute of wheat and chickens as the
price or consideration of a seventy-year-old conveyance in fee.189 The appellant’s
lawyer argued:
[W]hether we have, in this State, an institution of servitude; and,
if so, whether it is a relic of the past soon to wear out, or a thing
just beginning life and vigor, fitted to grow and expand to an
indefinite extent; whether it came from the feudal contrivances
used for the oppression of labor in the Old World or is one of
our own: and, if the latter, by what malign influences it was
183 See supra note 170.
184 For examples of such instances, see cases cited supra notes 170, 172–73.
185 The most prominent example though is Payne v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 81 Tenn.
507 (1884). See VanderVelde, The Anti-Republican Origins, supra note 37.
186 PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION
(2011).
187 See VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8, at 504.
188 ALBANY J. MUNSELL, SLAVERY, OR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE: DOES IT LEGALLY EXIST
IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK? POINTS ON ARGUMENT IN COURT OF APPEALS. OPINIONS IN
COURT OF APPEALS (1864).
189 Id. at 4.
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generated and nourished, and is now sustained in the midst of
our free institutions.190
The impassioned lawyer continued, “[t]he manner in which you [decide] will deter-
mine your lot, whether you are to be classed as freemen or marked as slaves.”191
Although the rent-service obligation was relatively slight, the attorney pressed for the
principle that involuntary servitude, even for a day, should not be permitted to exist.192
Other real property cases similarly invoked the “servitude” language of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to seek the removal of “servitudes that run with the land” (a kind
of property estate). The issue was considered again in the 1866 New York Supreme
Court case of Tyler v. Heidorn.193 In that case, another land owner challenged his
annual obligation to provide wheat to the successors of the dominant estate.194 The
court refused to recognize this no-longer-voluntary obligation to produce wheat as
an involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment by distinguishing
it as a land servitude rather than a personal one.195 The court concluded:
If the doctrine contended for be well founded, it sweeps away all
contracts, so far as respects their obligation upon all persons
except the original parties thereto. . . . [N]o parties can ever be
bound by the contracts of others, although they may enjoy the
property, in regard to which the contract is made. . . . [C]onse-
quences so sweeping and destructive could not have been intended
or anticipated by the authors or approvers of this amendment to
the constitution.196
190 Id. at 3. “Free institutions” was often the marker for Republican arguments.
191 Id. at 13. “It is like declaring a man to be free, and then attempting to show that he is
a person held to service, by citing cases where slaves have been so held.” Id. at 12.
192 Id. at 4 (“But, by the same rule, if the owner of lands should covenant to serve three hun-
dred and sixty-five days in the year . . . .”). This case has some parallels to the early twentieth
century case of Miller v. Clary, 103 N.E. 1114 (N.Y. 1913), in which the New York court struck
down an affirmative covenant failing to hold that it ran with the land because “[t]he evil and
lasting effect . . . would compel all persons who might thereafter become the owners . . . to
forever pump and supply water . . . .” Id. at 1117. The court did enforce an obligation on the
servient estate by converting an affirmative covenant into a negative covenant to accept the
dominant estate owner’s right to enter and get his own water. Id. Some commentators on this
famous case have read it as consistent with the prudential understanding that to require con-
tinued “forever” exertion was tantamount to involuntary servitude.
193 46 Barb. 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
194 Id. at 442.
195 Id. at 457–59.
196 Id. at 457–58. Yet, fifty years later in the early-twentieth-century case of Miller, 103
N.E. 1114, the court struck down an affirmative covenant as failing to run with the land. See
supra note 192.
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The prospect that the entire system of servitudes that ran with the land would col-
lapse was too much for the court to bear. Personal servitudes were different, but this
was not a personal servitude in the court’s eyes; it was a species of real property.197
To see how contemporary court’s viewed the newly enacted Amendment in labor
situations, it is useful to consider two other cases from 1865: one case from a free
state (Pennsylvania), that applied the Thirteenth Amendment broadly as a shield,198
and the other from a former slave state (Maryland), that interpreted the Amendment
so narrowly as not to apply to a statute that compelled African American youth to
labor bound in apprenticeships.199
In both cases, the state courts attempted to work out how the constitutional
decree affected their respective laws of master and servant.200 In the Pennsylvania
case, the judge viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as redressing the balance of rights
between employees and their employers by broadly analogizing subordination prin-
ciples to mitigated forms of slavery.201 In the Maryland case, however, the judge failed
to analogize at all. In fact, the judge interpreted the Amendment’s language as only
applying to persons legally recognized as slaves, not further.202 Thus the contemporary
expectations for the Thirteenth Amendment in the very year of its passage depended
upon whom you consulted: a judge from a free state or a judge from a former slave
state; a Radical Republican or a Conservative one; a former master or a freedman.
The key distinction between interpretations by the Pennsylvania and Maryland judges
was their willingness to analogize subordinating aspects of master-servant law to
involuntary servitude, or even slavery, just as the issue had divided Radical Republi-
cans from conservative Congressmen.203
1. The State of Pennsylvania
In the example of the Pennsylvania case of Ford v. Jermon,204 a Philadelphia
judge refused to enjoin a departing actress from performing at a rival theater.205 The
actress, Mrs. Jermon, had contracted to perform a play, and decided, for her own
unstated reasons, not to go through with the performance; she quit and sought em-
ployment elsewhere.206 Most congressmen at that time agreed that, at the very least,
the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to quit a labor contract.207 Mrs.
197 Tyler, 46 Barb. at 457–58.
198 See infra Section III.B.1.
199 See infra Section III.B.2.
200 See infra Sections III.B.1, 2.
201 See infra Section III.1.
202 See infra Section III.B.2.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 71–95.
204 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865).
205 Id. at 7.
206 Id. at 6.
207 Even Senator Cowan, who advocated a very limited scope for the Thirteenth Amendment,
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Jermon’s contract even contained clauses providing that she would not appear at any
competing venue for the season’s duration.208 The theater owner, Ford, sought to
enjoin her from performing for a competitor.209
Judge Hare viewed the request for an injunction as an attempt to keep Mrs.
Jermon captive by forcing her back to her employer in order to earn her living.210 He
saw a mitigated form of slavery in that attempt at indirect compulsion:
We are asked to say that Mrs. Jermon shall not play at all, unless
she will consent to play for the complainant; are we also to declare
that she shall not sing? [S]hall not earn her bread by writing or
by her needle? To debar her from one pursuit would be vain and
futile, unless she were also excluded from others, that might, so
far as we can tell, be more profitable.211
Embedded in this argument was judicial recognition of the significance of
earning one’s bread by one’s chosen trade.212 Judge Hare questioned why the actress
should be compelled indirectly to come to terms with a theater owner for whom she
now refused to work.213 He rhetorically questioned to what lengths the court should
go in holding her to a contract that prevented her from earning money to sustain
herself.214 The emphasis here was not on the court’s powerlessness to enforce such
an order, but on the underlying importance of ensuring an employee’s right to quit
and pursue her trade elsewhere. Finally, Judge Hare articulated the free-labor
principle in terms of slavery itself:
Is it not obvious that a contract for personal services thus en-
forced would be but a mitigated form of slavery, in which the
party would have lost the right to dispose of himself as a free
agent, and be, for a greater or less length of time, subject to the
control of another?215
conceded that it gave workers a right to quit. VanderVelde, Labor Vision, supra note 8, at
489 n.224.
208 Ford, 6 Phila. at 6.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 7.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 6–7.
214 Id. at 7. Judge Hare also predicted that forcing employees back to their employers would
spread to other types of trades: “Are such decrees to be made solely with reference to actors,
or shall lawyers be held to their clients, mechanics to their employers, and servants to their
masters, by the same process?” Id.
215 Id. (emphasis added).
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Judge Hare suggested this cause of action was slave-like.216 To call the employer’s
request for injunction “a mitigated form of slavery” thus connected the Thirteenth
Amendment, then being ratified by the states, to his interpretation of the state’s
common law.217
The case did not present the opportunity to challenge the separate writ of
enticement should Ford have attempted to sue any theater that Mrs. Jermon had run
off to. But the gist of the argument—“that Mrs. Jermon shall not play at all, unless
she will consent to play for the complainant”—seems to dictate the conclusion.218
This is consistent with Republican thinking. As Congressman Bundy stated “Why, sir,
we not only owe to all conditions of men the boon of personal freedom, but we owe
to them access to the means for their living.”219 Unfortunately, the progeny of this
case was limited by the later introduction of the British case, Lumley v. Wagner,220
which found its way into the American common law through the footnotes of treatises
like Blackstone.221
2. The State of Maryland, the Loyal Slave State
The same year that a Pennsylvania court made the connection between the sub-
ordinating aspects of master-servant law and the Thirteenth Amendment’s labor vision,
a few hundred miles away, a Maryland court seemed blind to the involuntary servitude
imposed upon young African Americans in the form of a state system for indentur-
ing of free blacks.222 Technically, the 1865 case in Maryland operated in a double
twilight zone that year. The case occurred after the Thirteenth Amendment was passed
by Congress, but before it had been ratified by the states. The basic provisions of the
Amendment were in place in Maryland, however, because by this time, Maryland,
acting quickly, had already amended its state constitution in accordance with the
language of the Thirteenth Amendment (and modeled it, as the Amendment itself
was, on the language of the Northwest Ordinance).223 Thus, while the Amendment
was on the national table awaiting ratification by a sufficient number of states, the
identical language was already in effect in Maryland under the state constitution.224
In Brown v. State,225 the Maryland court affirmed a conviction of criminal entice-
ment brought against a woman who urged a free young black man to leave his
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1867).
220 64 E.R. 1209 (1852).
221 For a full account of this development, see VanderVelde, Gendered Origins, supra
note 139.
222 See infra Section III.B.2.
223 Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503, 504 (1865).
224 Id. at 504, 507–08.
225 23 Md. 503 (1865).
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master.226 It is quite likely that the woman, Adeline Brown, was the boy’s mother,
since they shared the same last name. The State prosecuted Adeline for encouraging
her son to enjoy his new freedom that had been announced by the state’s constitutional
amendment.227 In her defense, her attorney urged that she could not be convicted of
criminal enticement for encouraging young George Brown to quit his master because
George was now free to quit.228 Her attorney argued that George’s indenture was
void because the state system for indenturing young free blacks had been invalidated
by the state’s constitutional reform abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude.229
Surprisingly, the Maryland Court of Appeals failed to see any connection at all
between the statutory practice of indenturing young African Americans and the
constitutional amendment, and thus upheld the woman’s conviction.230
To establish the legitimacy of indenture systems, not surprisingly, the State’s
attorney cited Blackstone’s Commentaries.231 Blackstone’s Chapter Fourteen, “Of
Master and Servant,” described the legitimacy of apprenticeship programs for white
persons: “[A]ll the features claimed to be objectionable in the negro apprentice
system in this State prevail. Indeed, the most of them prevail in the white apprentice
system of this State.”232 Given this circumstance, the Thirteenth Amendment
language would ban both systems of indenture. 
The court rejected the argument that the system indenturing free blacks was a form
of racial slavery by stating simply that in Maryland there were well-known distinctions
between the two statuses—slaves and free blacks.233 The court reasoned that free black
persons had disabilities, such as subjection to indenture, but they were in the category
of free black persons—not “slaves”—so the amendment did not apply to them.234
Hence, according to the court slavery’s abolition had no effect at all on free Blacks or
black indenture because each was designated a separate status category. This ruling
negated even the intersection of the two objectives of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
purpose, because: 1) this statute applied exclusively to African Americans; and 2)
it bound individuals to compulsory labor.235 The separate legal categories proved
enough of a distinction for the court to overlook the obvious connection. The court
226 Id. at 505–06.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 506.
229 Id. at 508–09.
230 Id. at 511–12.
231 Id. at 504. The State’s attorney also cited James Kent’s Commentaries on American
Law which refer to Blackstone. Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 508.
234 Id. (“It is very clear that the words slavery and slaves, used in these clauses of the
Constitution, cannot be applied to a free negro apprenticed under the law as contained in the
Code. The terms slaves and free negroes were or are well known in our legislation and juris-
prudence, and they describe two distinct classes of our African population.”).
235 See id.
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could not perceive that the Maryland statute was sufficiently slave-like or tanta-
mount to slavery to fall by virtue of Maryland’s constitutional amendment.236
Nor did the Maryland court see the system as violating the second prohibitory
clause, “involuntary servitude.”237 In fact, it read the phrase as not actually banning
anything, but instead as merely legitimating the practice of convict labor.238 The court
turned the exception inside-out by saying that the term, “involuntary servitude” was
included in the amendment only to expressly legitimate an exception—that is, au-
thorizing prisoners to be assigned to hard labor when duly convicted of crime.239 The
court could not see the senselessness of this argument. If the first phrase did all the
work of banning slavery, the second phrase “involuntary servitude” was unnecessary.
Those convicted of a crime could be sentenced to hard labor in many states at the time.
Finally, the court failed to see that a state system of indenturing that was designed to set
black persons—and only black persons240—to labor was “special legislation.”241 Instead,
the court described the compulsory system as beneficial to those involuntarily in-
dentured, much as slavery had once been described as beneficial to its victims.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection provision had not yet been
enacted at that time. Nonetheless, the Reconstruction Congress took note of this
Maryland ruling, and condemned it immediately. Congressman Elliot stated:
I think the jurisdiction of the [Freedmen’s] bureau should be
extended to Maryland as soon as possible. . . . At the same place,
in November, 1865, a colored woman was sentenced to be sold
236 Id. at 511–12.
237 Id. at 508–09.
238 See id.
239 Id. at 508–09 (“Nor can it be successfully maintained that the phrase involuntary servitude,
embraces the condition of the negro apprentice in Maryland, bound out in compliance with
the terms and requirements of our law. . . . The exception annexed to it explains it. The labor
imposed upon one convicted of crime, is involuntary servitude. Without the exception, a
sentence to hard labor in a penitentiary would be prohibited by the Constitution, though the
offender might be deprived of his liberty by simple confinement there.”).
240 David S. Bogen, From Racial Discrimination to Separate but Equal: The Common Law
Impact of the Thirteenth Amendment, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 117, 118 n.17 (2011) (“Maryland
apprenticeship laws authorized state officials to make the children work for masters until the
age of twenty-one. White apprenticeship was a personal mentorship in which apprenticeship
was a choice; the apprentice had a right to an education, and could not be assigned to others.
African-Americans did not have such rights in their indentures and were even described as
the property and interest of the master.” (citations omitted)).
241 Brown, 23 Md. at 511–12 (“Besides, the sections of the Code relating to or ranged under
the title of negro apprentices, cannot be denominated a special law. They are part and parcel
of a general law found in the volume of the Code embracing the Public General Laws of the
State, and can no more be regarded a special law, because applicable to one class of our popu-
lation, than those sections which relate to white apprentices. We, therefore, do not consider
that there is any inconsistency in this respect with this provision of the Constitution, which would
operate a repeal of those sections.”).
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for two years for persuading her children to leave their former
master, to whom they were apprenticed. The children had secured
places to work, and their wages for the year would have amounted
to $400.242
This may well have been Adeline Brown. Another Congressman added:
Tell me, oh, tell me not, then, of four million black people hav-
ing been emancipated from chattel slavery when by this act you
impose a cruel legal slavery in its most odious forms . . .243
Two years after the decision in Adeline Brown’s case, the ruling was overturned
in a ruling on a habeas corpus petition brought by another indentured black person.244
The judge in that case was Radical Republican and United States Supreme Court
Justice Salmon P. Chase, sitting in federal circuit cases. Chase wrote, “The alleged
apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary servitude, within the meaning of
these words in the amendment,” and ordered that the petitioner, Elizabeth Turner,
be discharged from the master to whom she had been indentured.245
The particular system under which George Brown and Elizabeth Turner had
been indentured was designed for free black youth. But other states were slower to
realize that involuntary apprenticeship violated the Thirteenth Amendment when it
applied to white youth as well. In 1869, an Arkansas court reasoned:
Binding children out as apprentices is now right, because it is law.
It is said to be for their good; that the master will care for and pro-
tect his servant. Should public sentiment change, and better provi-
sion be made for the poor, and acts placing children of the State
under bonds of indenture to serve a master for fifteen or twenty
long years, by law be declared a restraint upon natural liberty,
and an involuntary servitude for that great number of years, and a
crime against the law, then courts would adjudge apprenticeships
against public policy, a restraint upon natural rights, contrary to
law, and void. But no objections which we may now have to
placing a bright child for years under a master will allow us to
adjudge against such act; and, under our system of government,
242 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2777 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Elliot).
243 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 539 (1867) (remarks of Rep. Brooks).
244 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339–40 (Md. 1867) (declaring a similar alleged apprentice-
ship was involuntary servitude, within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as a
violation of “the first section of the civil rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, ‘full and equal benefit of all laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens’”).
245 Id.
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can a change in policy and future legislative action come back
and make void what we are lawfully doing now? Public policy is
but the manifested will of the State, and the question is, whether
by a change in her will or policy, under our national Constitu-
tion, she can destroy a contract made under and sanctioned by
her former policy.246
If the servitude were involuntary, it would seem that it would not matter whether the
apprentice was white or black, or under age or a full adult. Yet, the binding out of
young people and the poor was much slower to disappear in the United States.247
3. The State of Indiana
Even by 1865, when Adeline Brown’s case was decided, the decision was
inconsistent with existing judicial interpretations of the language regarding other
statutes indenturing free blacks in regions covered by the Northwest Ordinance.248
As early as 1821, in the well-known Indiana case, The Case of Mary Clark, A Woman
of Colour,249 the Indiana Supreme Court struck down a similar system of indenture
of free blacks by utilizing the exact same rhetorical technique of analogy and simile
used by Reconstruction Congressmen in considering peonage and redemptioner im-
migration250 and by the Pennsylvania court in Ford v. Jermon251:
[A] covenant for service, if performed at all, must be personally
performed under the eye of the master; and might, . . . require a
number of years. Such a performance, if enforced by law, would
produce a state of servitude as degrading and demoralizing in its
consequences, as a state of absolute slavery; and if enforced
under a government like ours, which acknowledges a personal
equality, it would be productive of a state of feeling more dis-
cordant and irritating than slavery itself.252
Holding the petitioner, Mary Clark, a free African-American woman, to inden-
tured servitude would be “as degrading and demoralizing in its consequences, as a
246 Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 633–34 (1869).
247 See generally Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can’t Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract
in Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265 (1992) (detailing American laws that compelled
the poor and orphan children to labor). 
248 See The Case of Mary Clark, A Woman of Colour, 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. 1821).
249 Id.
250 See supra Section II.A.
251 See Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865) (“[A] contract for personal services thus
enforced would be but a mitigated form of slavery.”).
252 Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. at 124–25.
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state of absolute slavery.”253 Hence, the indenture system could not stand in the face
of the language banning enslavement,254 let alone “involuntary servitude”255:
If a man, contracting to labour for another a day, a month, a year,
or a series of years, were . . . compelled to perform the labour, it
would either put a stop to all such contracts, or produce in their
performance a state of domination in the one party, and abject
humiliation in the other.256
It was exactly the possibility of such domination and abject humiliation that the
Reconstruction Congress sought to abolish because it presented an obstacle to the
nation becoming a true republic:
A state of servitude thus produced, either by direct or permissive
coercion, would not be considered voluntary either in fact or in
law. . . . [H]er application to the Circuit Court to be discharged
from the custody of her master, establishes the fact that she is
willing to serve no longer; and, while this state of the will appears,
the law cannot . . . presume that her service is voluntary . . . .
The fact then is, that the appellant is in a state of involuntary
servitude; and we are bound by the [state] constitution, the supreme
law of the land, to discharge her therefrom.257
All three of these cases demonstrate the Amendment’s defensive function as a
shield rather than guaranteeing an enhanced labor status. But more importantly,
these cases suggest a significant difference in interpretation by state courts on the
subject of the Amendment’s reach. Free states, on the one hand, such as Pennsylva-
nia and Indiana, adopted a liberal use of the Amendment’s language by analogizing
employer overreaching to slavery.258 Former slave states such as Maryland, on the
other hand, refused to construe the Amendment’s language any more broadly than
to the tight categorical assignment as a chattel slave.259 For former slave states, the
Amendment spoke only to declaring the status of slavery ended, nothing more.
253 Id. at 124.
254 See id. at 125.
255 Id. at 123.
256 Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
257 Id. at 125–26. The Indiana Court noted that “[t]he appellant in this case is of legal age
to regulate her own conduct; she has a right to the exercise of volition; and, having declared her
will in respect to the present service, the law has no intendment that can contradict that decla-
ration.” Id. (emphasis added). This could distinguish Mary Clark’s situation from young Mr.
Brown’s; he may have been under age.
258 See id. at 122; Ford v. Jermon, 6 Phila. 6 (Dist. Ct. 1865).
259 See Brown v. State, 23 Md. 503, 508 (1865).
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CONCLUSION
The Thirteenth Amendment’s potential to revise master-servant hierarchies, as
evidenced by dozens of speeches of Republican leaders in the Reconstruction Congress,
came to be snuffed out in the courts by two different restrictive sets of decisions.
First, the United States Supreme Court’s parsimonious readings of the Amendment
left it merely a tombstone of the Civil War. The Court discouraged the development
of its jurisprudence by limiting interpretations, much as the Court wiped out the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, an entire clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, state courts were never forced to reconsider master and servant doctrine
because there were no causes of action recognized at law where employees could
attempt to expand the envelope of free labor. Ultimately, the Reconstruction Con-
gress’s attempt to dislodge the hierarchy of master-servant was squandered, as the
focus on the material working conditions of freedmen came to be overtaken by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s focus on state action, concerns about suffrage in the Fif-
teenth Amendment, and Congress’s unsuccessful effort to impeach a president. Yet,
the Thirteenth Amendment is still there. It may be dormant, but it is essential to free-
dom under the U.S. Constitution, and should be read in the context of the history of
one of the nation’s most egalitarian periods of law reform.
